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ARGUMENT 
The Appellee brief presented three arguments for this court to uphold or affirm 
Appellant's conviction: First, "[t]he evidence established Schwenke's Guilt for Securities 
Fraud"; Second, "[t]his court should not consider Schwenke's unpreserved challenge to expert 
testimony regarding the characteristics of stock", and Third, "Schwenke's prosecutorial 
misconduct and Constitutional claims fail because the prosecutor accurately charged and argued 
the law". These arguments are addressed here next. 
L The evidence did not establish Schwenke was guilty of Securities Fraud. 
A. The alleged offer, sale and purchase of securities. 
The Court is urged to note that all the cases cited by the government are civil cases 
construing the Federal Security and Exchange laws. The government failed to cite one case that 
was decided based on Utah Code Ann. Section 61-1-1 or any statute similar thereto. The 
government started its argument by claiming that "economic reality" test promulgated by the 
United States Supreme Court in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) does not apply to 
the case at hand. Instead, the government claims that the Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth/ 471 
1
 "This case presents the question whether the sale of all of the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject 
to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the Acts)." Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, at 
683. 
5 
U.S. 681 (1985) is ccn^oilin: ;>:v: &c rj • -•• <•-. ui J .ir\: v that case to hold that the American 
Daity.com stock involved in this case is a security under the Utah criminal statute. The 
must be disregarded. The Landreth case is a civil case construing the Federal Securities Law, not 
the Utah criminal law that Schwenke was convicted under. To review Schwenke's felony 
cri minal con v ictioii against a much lesser standard of a ci \ ;il • >• is inherently ' i infair t >ecause it 
i :::' luces the governments burden to sustain U>* criminal con\iction. 
More.',-..: :-L .;XIK o: , \r..-:c„:. . •„..•• ..,::. in .his case and the facts and. circumstances 
surrounding the ownership b^ iVir. Young and Air. \U^rs of block certificates are clearly not 
comparable to the transaction in Lan_drcth Thr. :• the Landreth family owned all the outstanding 
o • - • - > r : v - . * • " . ; ' • : • ' > . : • . J . •!•* . , h 
and out of state, 1 he issue then* was whether or no! the stork of ihe l^iiber business was 
"security'' under the anti-fraud provisions Gi v^ J-edcu. NcLunucs Laws. 
The United States Supreme Court first acknowledged that "the fact that instruments bear 
the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts." Landreth Timber 
instruments possess "some of the significant characteristics typically associated with" stock, id., 
at * . recognizing :;V.L when .:n instrument r< joli; cal-^ ' >. >ck and bears stock's usual 
characteristics, "a pwchaser justifiably una- :*:: -^ urne that the Fe.:/rnl ^ - -v\uc^! -vs mob ' ' 
6 
at 850. We identified those characteristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the 
ability to be picd^u o.- irypoJiCituiu, M\J U}C U iil^Ting. ul w)tiiif; rights M \dc\y ru^.. ^ u:^  
ber of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. *fn2 Id -n - ^ 1." A/ 
(Emphasis added). Against this backdrop, the Supreme L o,.:. K^.L\. ILL i.a..~rei:. -I . ... : 
family lumber business was security for purposes of the anti-fraud provisions of the Federal 
Securities Laws because the stock was marketed by in and out of state brokers and the stock had 
the characteristics (set forth abo\ e) usuall) associated "\ v itli comm • ^ ••.-* 
In Landreth, after the purchase of the timber business, the buyers soon discovered that the 
mill did not live up to their expectation. Hie rebuilding costs exceeded earlier estimates and the 
lie w components ti lrned 01 it \:: •• *x <. i ^ : n a equipment. Eventually the 
buyers sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. The buyers then filed a "suit seeking 
rescission of the sale , siock and $2,500,000 1 ti damages, alleging uuii ^ ^\»\v.- -u- - ... • -
widely offered and then sold their stock without registering it as required by the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq. (1933 Act)." Id at 684 Buyers "also alleged that respondents 
[Sell' r<?! hac iegl:_- :nli\ oi :.uenn \iali> made .nisrepr^sentauon-- and ha.. fail :d ro stale ;.naterk;; 
facts as to the worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 15 U S. C § ' 78a et seq. (1934 ,/ let) ' : Id 
None of the civil claims in Landreth have any relevance or similarity to the criminal 
:1 
charges involved in this case. Yet the government is urging the court to apply the Landreth case 
as controlling in this case. More importantly, the facts of the case are not even close. The 
government witnesses testified and confirmed that it was a new corporation set up for the farmers 
which they, as the only two shareholders, wholly owned - no "stock" of the corporation was sold, 
issued, etc. American Dairy.com was not an existing and ongoing corporation that was selling its 
stock. 
There was no evidence that Schwenke owned an ongoing corporation and he sold his 
stock in the corporation in violation of the anti-fraud provision of the Federal Securities and 
Exchange Act. There was no evidence that American Dairy.com stock provided that right to 
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits because there was no evidence of 
profits or that it could have profits. The two stock certificates reflected only the interest the two 
farmers had in their closely held corporation. There was no evidence that the American 
Dairy.com stock could be pledged or hypothecated. Both Mr. Young and Mr. Myers knew that 
American Dairy.com stock had no value, and without any value, there is no chance that it could 
be pledged or hypothecated. Lastly, the American Dairy.com stock had no capacity to appreciate 
in value unless a sufficient number of farmers joined with a minimum of cows to make American 
Dairy.com viable to register an initial public offering. The evidence is clear that both Mr. Young 
and Mr. Myers knew, and had no misunderstanding, that an initial public offering was a goal well 
into the future when many farmers with many cows join the company. There is simply no 
g 
comparison between American Dairy.com and the Landreth Timber corporation. 
The government next claimed that Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990) confirms 
that Landreth standard should be applied to this case. Yet Reves is further removed from this 
case because it involved the issue of whether a "note" as opposed to "stock" is a security?2 There 
an agricultural cooperative ("co-op") had approximately 23,000 members. To raise money to 
support its general business operations, the co-op sold uncollateralized and unsecured demand 
notes to members and non-members of the co-op. In its advertisements for the notes, the co-op 
newsletter read in part: "YOUR CO-OP has more than $11,000,000 in assets to stand behind 
your investments. The Investment is not Federally [sic] insured but it is . . . Safe . . . Secure . . . 
and available when you need it." Despite the assurances, the co-op filed for bankruptcy in 1984. 
The co-op had approximately 1600 members hold $10 million in notes when it filed for 
bankruptcy. A class of the note holders filed a civil lawsuit against the accounting firm alleging, 
inter alia, that it failed to follow generally accepted accounting principals in its audit and 
charging that the accounting firm had violated the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act as well as 
the Arkansas's securities laws. How the Reves case could be controlling or even persuasive in 
2
 "This case presents the question whether certain demand notes issued by the Farmers Cooperative of Arkansas 
and Oklahoma (Co-Op) are "securities" within the meaning of § 3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
Reves v Ernst & Young, at 56 
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this criminal prosecution boggles the mind. But that is what is before the court. The government 
is desperately grabbing onto anything to try and justify the Schwenke's frivolous prosecution. 
This court is urged to do what is right and vacate and reverse Appellant's frivolous conviction. 
B. Alleged failure to disclose material facts. 
The government started off by citing City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. 
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 669 (6th Cir. 2005) for the proposition that "In order to be 
actionable,.. .[an] omission must pertain to material information that the defendant had a duty to 
disclose". The government also cited Basic Inc. v. Levinsoru 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988) 
quoting "Silence, absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading". The Court is urged to please note 
once again that the government is presenting a civil case construing Federal Security and 
Exchange law3 that is very broad and expansive without any comparison to the very restricted 
3
 "In this appeal, we review the district court's dismissal with prejudice of a securities fraud class action 
Consolidated Complaint ("Complaint") filed by investors in Bridgestone Corporation ("Bridgestone") against 
Bridgestone, its subsidiary Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. ("Firestone"), Bridgestone Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") 
Yoichiro Kaizaki, and Bridgestone Executive Vice President and Firestone CEO Masatoshi Ono. The district court 
dismissed the claims against Kaizaki for lack of personal jurisdiction and dismissed the claims against Bridgestone, 
Firestone and Ono for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. For the reasons stated below, we 
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand." City of Monroe Employees Retirement System v. Bridgestone Corp.. at 
651. "This case requires us to apply the materiality requirement Of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
10 
and limited scope of the State criminal state that is before the court in this case. 
It is not clear why the government quoted from these civil cases, but what is clear is that 
the cases supported the failure of the prosecution to establish a case. Under the plain meaning of 
Section 61-1-1, Sehwenke's duty to disclose is limited to material facts necessary to make any 
misleading statements actually made by him, not misleading. Section 61-1-1 does not impose a 
duty, as claim by the government, to disclose all information a reasonable investor would want to 
know. The Bridgestone case citing Levinson and others stated very clearly what it will take for 
a misrepresentation or omission to be actionable under a Rule 10b-5 (Federal Securities Law 
civil suit, not Utah Section 61-1-1 criminal prosecution): 
1934,48 Stat. 881, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. (1934 Act), and the Securities and Exchange Commissions 
Rule 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, see 17 CFR § 240.10b-5 (1987), in the content of preliminary corporate merger 
discussions. We must also determine whether a person who traded a corporation's shares on a securities exchange 
after the issuance of a materially misleading statement by the corporation may invoke a rebuttable presumption that, 
in trading, he relied on the integrity of the price set by the market." Basic Inc. v. Levinson, at 226 
11 
In order to be actionable, a misrepresentation or omission must pertain to material 
information that the defendant had a duty to disclose, two significant limitations 
to the general policy of disclosure. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 238 ("[I]n order to 
prevail on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a plaintiff must show that the statements were not 
enough that a statement is false or incomplete., if the misrepresented fact is 
otherwise insignificant misleading as to a material fact. It is .") (emphasis in 
original omitted); In Re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410,1432 
(3d Cir. 1997) (M[T]here is no general duty on the part of a company to provide the 
public with all material information."). As this Court has recognized, this set of 
requirements preserves the healthy limits on a public corporation's "duty to 
disclose all information[,] even colorably material," because corporations might 
otherwise "face potential second-guessing in a subsequent disclosure suit," a 
regime that would threaten to "deluge investors with marginally useful 
information, and would damage corporations' legitimate needs to keep some 
information non-public." Sofamor Danek, 123 F.3d at 403 (internal quotations and 
citations omitted). A duty to affirmatively disclose "may arise when there is 
insider trading, a statute requiring disclosure," or, as relevant to this case, "an 
inaccurate, incomplete or misleading prior disclosure." In re Digital Island Sec. 
Litig., 357 F.3d 322,329 n.10 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 
Bridgestone, supra, para. 76 (Emphasis added) 
As Bridgestone illustrates, even under a civil proceeding, the government must establish 
that Schwenke had a duty to disclose and that duty may arise in insider trading, a statute or from 
inaccurate, incomplete or misleading prior statement. The statute in this case, Section 61-1-1 
requires the government to establish the misleading prior statement made by Schwenke. Absent 
from the government's case is any misleading statements made by Schwenke. In the Appellee 
brief the government failed to point to any misleading statements made by Schwenke but instead 
claims that".. .the prosecutor pointed out to the jury during closing argument, R.4:404-10 
Schwenke told Myers and Young that the American Dairy.com stock would be offered to the 
12 
public pursuant to an initial public offering (IPO), which was represented as the "foundation" of 
the plan. R.3:127,141-42; R.4:228, 236-37." Appellee Brief, pages 23 and 24. Obviously, what 
the prosecutor argues to the jury is not evidence. But even assuming there was discussion of an 
IPO, the evidence was clear that Schwenke was not selling an IPO. The plan was to recruit dairy 
farmers to join American Dairy.com, and only when enough farmers join, with at least 10,000 to 
15, 000 cows, would there be an effort to pursue an IPO. See TT pp.121-122,174-176 and 257-
258. Also see Appellant Brief pages 23 and 24. Mr. Young and Mr. Myers' farm was the first 
and only farm that joined and it had less than 200 cows. Given the 10,000 to 15,000 cow target 
(TT pp.121-122, Appellant Brief page 23) before consideration of an IPO, at the time of the 
transaction charged in this case, an IPO was not even a consideration. This fact was confirmed 
by Mr. Myers at trial: 
Q:[SCHWENKE] So you agree, then, there was intention or at least part of 
the plan is to have more than one dairy? 
A: [MYERS] Oh definitely. I mean there was no way the stock would ever be 
worth anything with just our dairy alone. 
Q: [SCHWENKE] You testified here earlier that it was only intended for your 
dairy to go public. 
A: [MYERS] No, no, no. If that was the impression, that's false 
Q:[SCHWENKE] In fact--
A: [MYERS] It would - - to do a public offering, it would have been that the stock 
was going to go. It wasn't that my dairy was going to a public off - - the 
American Dairy.com stock. When value that that American Dairy had 
would have been what would have gone public, in my opinion. I don't understand 
stock. 
Q:[SCHWENKE] You do believe then that was something that was an 
objective to accomplish in the future that somehow we would hope that by 
sometime in the future we would have enough cows, enough farms joining 
13 
the corporation here, then we'll look into going into a public offering; is that 
correct? 
A:[MYERS] Yes 
Q: [SCHWENKE] So this idea of the IPO was something that would happen - -
would take place under this plan only after there's enough farmers join the 
corporation; is that correct? 
A: [MYERS] That would be cor - - that would be correct. 
See T.pp. 257-258. (Emphasis added) See also, Appellant Brief page 24. 
The transaction in this case is not an IPO. Yet, the government insists that Schwenke 
should have made disclosures in connection with an IPO. Without agreeing that the 
government's version of the disclosures required for an IPO are correct, Appellant can state 
categorically that he had no duty under the Section 61-1-1 to make such alleged IPO disclosures 
such as "risk, capitalization, distribution, commissions to be paid, background of principals and 
control persons involving in the issuing company". The evidence is clear that there was no sale 
of a security and there was no IPO and the government's case fails, and Schwenke's wrongful 
conviction must be reversed. 
Finally, in its desperate effort to make a case against Schwenke, the government claims 
that its case "did not rest only on allegations of material omissions", but also on an untrue 
statement made by Schwenke. The government claims that Schwenke lied that he had 
$10,000,000.00 in assets to invest to pay Mr. Young and Mr. Myers' dairy farm debts. The 
statement is false because American Dairy.com had no financial documents, no bank accounts, 
and no assets and it was essentially a paper entity. Moreover, proof that Schwenke did not have 
14 
any money was when he failed to pay for the additional cows. Assuming arguendo that 
Schwenke made such a statement, there was no evidence that Schwenke did not have the alleged 
assets, and more importantly, there was no evidence that Schwenke had a legal duty to pay Mr. 
Young and Mr. Myers' dairy farm debts. Significantly, if Schwenke had made such an oral 
promise, the promise should have merged into the written agreement entered into by the parties 
on August 9,2000. Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck, 354 P.2d 559, (Utah 1960). The same is 
also true with respect to the alleged promise to pay for 200 cows that Mr. Young ordered for the 
dairy. The only conclusion the court can reach in this case is that Schwenke did not make any 
untrue statements and he did not make any misleading statements that could be made, not 
misleading, with about 20 omissions the government presented to the jury resulting on 
Schwenke's conviction. 
II. The Court should exclude improper expert testimonies of the Government 
Employee, Michael Hines. 
The government urges the Court to reject the plain and undeniable impermissible legal 
opinion provided by its employee as an expert, Mr. Michael Hines. The government does not 
deny the improper testimony but asked the Court to exclude it because it was not properly 
preserved, Appellant has not claimed plain error or exceptional circumstances, and the testimony 
actually comports with Rule 702. Appellee Brief, pages 28 and 29. None of the government's 
claims for the Court to ignore the impermissible legal opinion has any merits. 
First, the government described Mr. Harmon's objection to the line of questions as not 
15. 
clear enough to give notice that he was objecting to the improper impartial expert testimony of 
the government employee, Mr. Hines. Contrary to the government description, Mr. Harmons' 
objection was timely as to all the testimony that follows the denial of the objection which 
included testimonies from pages 283 through and including 288. Second, even assuming 
arguendo that counsel failed to object properly, the issue before the Court is a question of law. 
State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19,23 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). As a question of law, the Court could rule 
on the issue, de novo, without deference to the trial court. If the appellate court could rule on a 
question of law without deference to the trial court, it certainly could do so even if the issue was 
not raised or ruled upon by the trial court. 
The impermissible alleged expert testimony of the government's employee is plain error 
that should be reviewed even if it was not raised below. "To establish plain error and to obtain 
appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, Defendant must show that 
"(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is 
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
[Defendant]."" State v. AlfatlawL 153 P.3d 804, 2006 UT App 511 (Utah App. 12/21/2006) 
citing State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,f 16,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citation omitted); see also 
State v. Powell 872 P.2d 1027,1031 (Utah 1994). 
The transcript of the trial is filled with improper legal opinion testimonies by Mr. Hines, a 
government employee testifying as an expert for the government. But only one incident is cited 
16 
in the Appellant brief as an example. See Appellant Brief, pages 26 to 30. The incident cited is 
an undisputed improper legal opinion that the stock involved in this case is a security. 
Accordingly, an error does exist. The next inquiry is whether or not the error should have been 
obvious to the trial court. The Supreme Court explained that the plain error test is two-pronged. 
State of Utah v. Julie Warren Verde. 770 P.2d 116,101 Utah Adv. Rep. 37 (1989): 
First, the error must be "plain" or "manifest." This is sometimes termed an 
"obviousness" requirement. After examining the record, an appellate court must 
be able to say "that it should have been obvious to a trial court that it was 
committing error." *fiil 1 Id. at 9. Second, the error must be of sufficient 
magnitude that it affects the substantial rights of a party. In other words, applying 
the standard we explained in State v. Knight 734 P.2d at 919, the appellant must 
show a reasonable likelihood that absent the error, the outcome below would have 
been more favorable. *fhl2 
Id, (Emphasis added). Any review of the record will clearly show the error. Accordingly, the 
error is plain in conformity with the plain error standard. 
The second prong under Julie Warren Verde is the same as the third element provided for 
under Alfatlawi above which is, the "error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [Defendant]" Assuming arguendo that defense 
counsel, Mr. Harmon, actually failed to object and preserve the issue of the improper legal 
opinion, the harm to Schwenke is definite and sure. There is no question that absent the error, 
the entire improper testimony of Mr. Hines should have been kept from the jury. Without 
improper legal opinion testimony that American Dairy.com stock was "security" a conviction 
would have been unlikely. Accordingly, the Court is respectfully urged to review the claim 
17 
against Mr. Hine's improper legal testimony because failure to do so would result in manifest 
injustice and to reverse the wrongful conviction on this ground as well 
III. The Constitutional claims are valid and should be considered by the court. 
A. The government argues that the Constitutional claim was not preserved. 
To make its claim that the Constitutional claim was not preserved, the government first 
classified the claim as one of prosecutorial misconduct, then argued that Schwenke did not object 
at trial; he therefore, failed to preserve this issue. Schwenke; however, did not consider the 
government's error in its theory of the case as prosecutorial misconduct. The government 
throughout its case, through counsel and primarily through its employee Michael Hines as its 
expert witness argued that Schwenke had a duty to disclose all the facts a reasonable prudent 
investor would want to know. Mr. Hines repeated at least a half a dozen times through his 
testimonies the same theme that once Schwenke offers American Dairy.com stock he was 
"requirefd] the disclosure of all material facts ..." TT pp 92-93. But this was error in the 
government's theory, not misconduct, unless the government knowingly and deliberately 
misstated the law. 
The government's error exist and was plain because a cursory review of the record will 
reveal the error. Finally, the error is harmful because but for the error Schwenke may not have 
been convicted of security fraud. 
IS 
B. The Information and Preliminary Hearing did not provide notice of the 
case that was actually presented to the jury, 
Schwenke was charged with violation of Section 61-1-1 which required the state to prove 
that he made misleading statements of material facts but omitted to make statements of material 
facts that would make the misleading material facts, not misleading. At trial, Schwenke was 
charged with failing to disclose all the material facts a reasonable prudent investor would want to 
know. These are two vastly different charges. The government's charging and proof errors exist 
and were plain because a cursory review of the record will reveal the errors. Finally, the error is 
harmful because but for the error Schwenke may not have been convicted of security fraud 
C. The Constitution violations of due process and separation of powers are 
plain errors. 
The Constitutional violations of due process and separation of power are plain errors for 
the same reasons as set forth under Section A and B. 
IV. The evidence of the Loan, the Purchase of Cows and Initial Public Offering are 
not relevant to the agreement that was completed long before any of these matters 
came about. 
It's unfortunate that the court denied remand to establish the evidence of the loan which 
would have established that the loan, which Mr. Young denied knowing anything about, was a 
loan that was taken out for Mr. Young's dairy. He received $7,000.00 of the proceeds and the 
balance of the proceeds ($5,500.00) was paid on a $15,000.00 bill from the company to facilitate 
the cleaning, construction, painting, installation of a web server, creation of a website, and 
19 
installation of computers and cameras throughout so the dairy could be viewed on the internet. 
The government presented a picture that Schwenke stole $50,000.00 from Mr. Young and Mr. 
Myer's dairy when the truth was that Young and Myer's dairy received it all. The Court is 
respectfully referred to Appellant Brief pages 38 to 49. 
CONCLUSION 
The four arguments presented by the government in opposition to the reversal of 
Schwenke's wrongful conviction are all without merits. The government's claim that the 
transaction involves the offer, sale and purchase of security is without support because there was 
no security. The government has no logical support for its claim that the "economic reality" test 
is not applicable here. The economic reality test is clearly applicable here because of the unique 
nature of the transaction where the stock was used primarily to reflect the interest of each 
participating farmer and the stock had none of the normal characteristics of common stock as an 
investment instrument. Moreover, there was no evidence of any misleading statements made by 
Schwenke that could be made, not misleading, by any of the alleged omissions charged by the 
government. 
The government also did not deny that its employee that testified as its expert gave 
impermissible legal opinion testimonies, rather it attempted to avoid the damage by claiming the 
error was not preserved. The legal opinion testimony followed a timely objection thus preserving 
it, but even if it was not, the impermissible legal opinion was a question of law and was plain 
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error that can still be reviewed. All of the other claims by the government of unpreserved issues 
can all be reviewed as questions of law or plain errors. 
For all the foregoing reasons, inter alia, Schwenke respectfully prays the honorable court 
would reverse his wrongful conviction and order his immediate freedom. 
Dated this (3day of September 2009. 
A. Paul Schwenke. 
Appellant Pro Se 
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